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THE TAX TREATMENT OF PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS IN IRELAND1 
Karina Doorley, Tim Callan, Mark Regan and John R. Walsh* 
ABSTRACT 
Tax treatments of pensions vary widely across countries. This paper examines the 
current tax treatment of pension contributions in Ireland and some widely 
discussed alternatives, including equalising the tax relief available to low and high 
earners. The analysis takes into account both explicit contributions in the private 
sector, and the implicit value of publicly funded pensions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Most OECD countries are facing the ‘twin challenge of ensuring both the 
adequacy and financial sustainability’ of their pension systems (OECD, 2014). 
Ageing populations, falling fertility rates and stagnating employment levels mean 
that funding the income of the elderly by using taxes paid by the working age 
population is becoming more and more difficult. Similar pressures affect Ireland 
although its relatively high fertility rate does afford some advantage compared to 
many European countries. 
Calls for reform of both public and private pension systems in Ireland have been 
frequent over the last decades and have come from many sources. The OECD, 
while acknowledging that Ireland is better positioned than many countries, 
recommends that Ireland ‘continue to adapt and fine-tune its pension system so 
that it can provide affordable and adequate benefits to Irish retirees in the long 
term’. Collins and Hughes (2017) also call for reform of the pension system, 
questioning the effectiveness of the current set of policy instruments focused on 
getting people to save for their retirement. Reform of State pension entitlement 
is already under way. The retirement age has increased from 65 to 66, and 
further increases – to 67 in 2021 and 68 in 2028 – have been announced and 
passed in legislation. 
1 This paper represents a development of work initially conducted for the Pensions Council. We thank the Council for 
initiating this project, and Council members Helen McDonald and Shane Whelan for helpful comments. We thank 
Gerry Reilly and the SILC team at the CSO for access to SILC data on which the SWITCH tax-benefit model is based. 
* Karina Doorley is Research Officer at the Economic and Social Research Institute, Research Fellow at the Institute of
Labor Economics and Adjunct Lecturer at Trinity College Dublin. Tim Callan is Research Professor at the Economic and
Social Research Institute, Research Fellow at the Institute of Labor Economics and Adjunct Professor at Trinity College
Dublin. Mark Regan is Research Assistant and John Walsh is Senior Research Analyst at the Economic and Social
Research Institute.
 
2 
 
State pensions in Ireland are not earnings related. As a result, the attainment of 
adequate replacement of employment income depends, for those on middle and 
higher incomes, on being supplemented by private pensions. Policy instruments 
which can encourage such private sector provision include both tax incentives 
and, potentially, legislative provisions regarding the availability of pension 
schemes to employees, and the manner of their operation. These can range from 
making membership of a pension scheme mandatory, to arrangements by which 
membership is automatic unless individuals opt out of the scheme. 
 
In this paper we focus on the tax treatment of pension contributions, which 
forms an important element of the overall tax treatment of pensions through 
pension contributions, investment income from pensions, and pensions in 
payment. This is a partial view of the overall territory, but offers some new 
insights. It does not lead directly to policy recommendations; several other 
factors would need to be taken into account in order to reach such conclusions. 
 
There is wide variation the tax treatment of pension contributions across 
countries. Whitehouse (1999 and 2000) sets out four distinct options, 
characterised by whether or not contributions, pension fund income, and 
payments of pensions are taxable (T) or exempt (E). The current tax treatment of 
pensions in Ireland can be characterised as broadly following the principle that 
contributions are exempt from income tax. Pension fund income, which is the 
investment income derived from them, is also exempt, while income received 
from a pension is taxable in the normal way. Such an approach is not uncommon 
internationally and is labelled EET as contributions are Exempt, investment 
income is Exempt, and pensions in payment are Taxed. In the Irish system, there 
is a deviation from the strict EET framework, as lump sum payments at 
retirement are also exempted from tax. Whitehouse characterises EET as an 
expenditure tax, which could also be achieved under a TEE regime, taxing 
contributions on entry, but leaving pension fund income and pensions in payment 
exempt from tax. About half of the countries surveyed by Whitehouse (2000) had 
tax regimes which approximated an expenditure tax, or were more favourable to 
pensions than that. 
 
However, the other half of the countries surveyed had tax treatments closer to 
the comprehensive income tax approach, either TTE or ETT. Given this wide 
variation in country practice, there is no single standard approach to the tax 
treatment of pensions which commands universal acceptance. Our analysis 
focuses solely on potential changes to the tax treatment of contributions. Thus, in 
the Irish context, we can contrast the impact of the current system – with 
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pension contributions exempt from tax – with alternatives where pension 
contributions are fully subject to tax, or have more restricted relief (e.g., through 
standardisation or hybridisation of the relief). It is not within the scope of this 
paper to move further to a full consideration of a move from EET to TEE (the 
prepaid expenditure tax) or TTE (one version of the comprehensive income tax). 
Nevertheless, the insights from this partial analysis of changes to the tax 
treatment of pensions may be of assistance in the broader debate regarding the 
tax treatment of pensions and alternative means (such as auto-enrolment) for 
the encouragement of pension savings. 
 
The Irish system exempts private pension contributions from income tax through 
its EET approach. EET systems are generally considered to result in higher pension 
contributions than TEE (Taxed, Exempt, Exempt) systems (Armstrong, 
2015).There is limited evidence that this kind of tax relief is cost effective in 
incentivising individuals or households to save for retirement. Rather, findings 
from international policy reforms indicate that when these incentives are 
introduced or removed, households divert private savings into pension 
contributions or vice versa (Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2003; Attanasio et al., 
2004; Chetty et al., 2014). Benjamin (2003) estimates that one-quarter of the 
savings under the US scheme known as 401(k) represents new national savings. In 
addition to this, households who normally save the most were found to be largely 
contributing funds that they would have saved anyway. This suggests that tax 
incentives for pension contributions face a ‘deadweight’ problem, whereby they 
subsidise savings that would have taken place anyway and this seems to be 
particularly so for those at higher incomes.  
 
As the tax relief afforded in Ireland is at the individual’s marginal tax rate, this 
makes it more beneficial to those with higher earnings. Potential paths to 
restructuring tax incentives for pension contributions were discussed in the 
Green Paper on Pensions (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2007). Among 
other reforms suggested, equalising the tax relief available to low and high 
earners was considered in order to increase the financial incentive for low 
earners to make pension contributions. Callan et al. (2009) and Collins and 
Hughes (2018) also discuss the distributional implications of the provision of tax 
relief at the individual’s marginal tax rate: the research reported here provides a 
more up-to-date picture, and examines the distributional implications of a move 
to alternative forms of tax relief such as standard rating of the relief.  
 
Pension funds are exempt from income and capital gains tax while pension 
income is subject to partial taxation on withdrawal from the fund. Estimates of 
the revenue foregone due to tax relief on pension contributions are available 
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from The Revenue Commissioners but should be interpreted with some caution. 
These estimates quantify the revenue foregone from exempting pension 
contributions from taxation, without adjustment for the change in pension 
contribution and investment behaviour that such a switch would result in. 
Nevertheless, the TET system provides a useful benchmark system against which 
we measure some reform scenarios – but the TET system is not proposed here as 
a policy reform. According to the Revenue Commissioners (2013), comparing the 
current EET Irish system with a hypothetical TET system yields a revenue 
foregone figure of approximately €1.3 billion.  
 
In this report we:  
• Quantify the cost of tax relief on private, occupational and public pension 
contributions relative to a scenario with no tax relief on pension 
contributions (i.e. a TET scenario). These calculations are on a similar basis to 
those undertaken by Revenue, and subject to the same limitations and 
qualifications; 
• Simulate the cost of changing the structure of tax relief by simulating a lower 
cap on tax relief and by investigating a standard rate relief and a hybrid rate 
relief; 
• Simulate the distributional consequences of such reforms; 
• Discuss potential behavioural responses to any reforms. 
 
THE IRISH PENSION SYSTEM 
The Irish public pension system consists of a basic public pension, complemented 
by a means-tested non-contributory pension. There is no earnings-related pillar 
or any mandatory occupational or personal pension. This makes voluntary 
contributions to private pension plans a very important overall component of 
retirement income. However, more than 50 per cent of workers do not make 
private pension contributions or do so during only part of their working careers 
(OECD, 2014).  
 
In a measure designed to promote complementary pension participation, 
contributions made by employees to public, private or occupational pension 
schemes are deductible for income tax purposes and tax relief is applied at the 
individual’s marginal income tax rate. The amount of employee contributions that 
can be tax-relieved is limited to an age-related percentage amount of the 
employee’s remuneration. Since 2011, tax-relievable contributions are subject to 
an annual earnings cap of €115,000 (€150,000 in 2010 and €250,000 prior to 
that). Employer contributions are also deductible in computing the employer’s 
profits. 
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Pension fund investments are generally exempt from tax on their capital gains 
and income. A temporary pension levy (introduced in 2011) taxed the entire 
accumulated fund but was phased out in 2016. Pension income is taxable on 
withdrawal as income at the individual’s marginal income tax rate although 
individuals can take tax-free lump sums. Debate about the tax treatment of 
pensions sometimes refers to the idea that the EET system involves a ‘deferral’ of 
taxation to the final stage, when pensions are in payment. Whelan and Hally 
(2018) argue that Ireland’s current, broadly EET system recoups a rather small 
proportion of the tax which would be raised under an alternative TTE system. 
Essentially, this contrast is between the higher revenue from a comprehensive 
income tax system (TTE), and the lower revenue from an expenditure tax 
approach (EET or the prepaid expenditure tax TEE). Cremer and Pestieau (2016) 
note that ‘the optimal policy is in general neither TEE nor TTE and which of these 
regimes is preferable is not clear’. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
SWITCH  
Our analysis uses SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, linked to data from SILC 
(Survey of Income and Living Conditions), the Central Statistics Office’s (CSO) 
main survey of household income.2 SILC is an annual survey conducted since 2003 
by the CSO in order to obtain information regarding the income and living 
conditions of Irish households. It is the Irish component of an EU-wide survey 
which aims to capture information on poverty and social exclusion across Europe. 
The survey is cross-sectional and also has a panel dimension with households 
surveyed annually. The SWITCH database is currently based on a pooled sample 
of households from the 2013 and 2014 waves of SILC.3 The SWITCH database 
contains almost 8,000 households or over 20,000 individuals.  
 
SWITCH simulates the disposable income each family would obtain under the 
current set of income tax and social welfare policies as well as in a counterfactual 
‘what-if’ scenario. For this analysis, SWITCH is used to simulate: 
• disposable income in the ‘baseline’ scenario, i.e. using the existing 2017 tax 
and benefit rules; 
• disposable income in the absence of any tax relief on pension contributions; 
 
                                                 
 
2  See Callan et al. (2013) for a full description of the model. 
3  The sample of households used to construct the SWITCH database contains all households from the 2014 survey, and 
all additional households from the 2013 survey that were not interviewed in the 2014 survey. This ensures that 
households that were interviewed for both the 2013 and 2014 waves of SILC are present only once in the SWITCH 
database.  
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• disposable income under alternative tax treatments of pension 
contributions. 
 
Estimating pension contributions  
SILC data contain information about the existence and amount of pension 
contributions made by an individual from their last wage, including amounts paid 
to personal pension plans such as Retirement Annuity Contracts (RACs) and 
Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSAs). For current purposes – the 
examination of tax relief related to pension contributions – we judge that it is 
best to exclude the ‘Pension-related Deduction’ (PRD) from the analysis. PRD was 
introduced in March 2009 for public service employees. The deduction is 
calculated on gross income and is treated as a pension contribution with tax relief 
provided at the marginal rate. However, the deduction does not affect the overall 
threshold levels for tax relief on pension contributions. We exclude PRD from the 
analysis because PRD is not, in fact, a contribution which increases an individual’s 
pension entitlement. In our view, it is more correctly treated as a mechanism 
designed to reduce payroll costs and net wages. The PRD is paid by the employee, 
this attracts a tax relief, and the net impact is a saving to the State and a 
reduction in disposable income. The level of PRD was chosen with the level of 
State saving, and hence reduction in disposable income, in mind. If the tax status 
of PRD were changed so that it no longer attracted tax relief, then the desired 
outcome could have been achieved with a smaller PRD contribution. This element 
does not really belong in the broader debate about the treatment of genuine 
pension contributions, which do raise retirement income. 
 
For those who indicate that they make a contribution from their wage, we take 
the reported amount, less any PRD. For those who report that they make a 
contribution from their wage, but do not report the amount of the deduction, we 
assume a contribution equal to the average contribution within their age group4 
and income quartile. There is no direct information on the amount of 
contributions by employers. Employer contributions are, therefore, imputed for 
those individuals who are covered by an occupational pension. Employer 
contributions are calculated as 8 per cent of employee gross earnings for all 
employees who contribute to a pension and state that their employer also 
contributes. This method is in line with how the Central Statistics Office estimates 
employer pension contributions. It also brings the total (employee + employer) 
average contribution to around 15 per cent, which was found to be the 
approximate average in previous work on this topic (Callan et al., 2008). Self-
 
                                                 
 
4  The age groups include: <30; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; >=60. 
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employed pension contributions are reported in the data and relate to 
contributions to individual private pension plans.  
 
We distinguish between public and private sector workers using the individual’s 
self-reported status. The public sector scheme is designed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis and therefore not funded on explicit contributions. However, we attribute 
value to the government’s implicit contribution. The rationale for this is explained 
more fully in Callan et al. (2007), and a similar point is also made by the Irish 
Association of Pension Funds IAPF (2008). If explicit contributions made by 
employees and employers were to become taxable at any point, then the tax-free 
status of the State’s implicit contribution would lead to a horizontal inequity. The 
accrual of pension benefits would be similar to ‘benefit-in-kind’ for public sector 
workers and the question of how to value and tax this benefit would arise. In our 
work, we try to incorporate the value of the implicit public service pension 
contributions in a similar way to the explicit contributions of employers and 
employees in the private sector. The Report of the Public Service Benchmarking 
Body (2007) includes a special study on the relative value of public and private 
sector pensions.5 Based on this, we assign an implicit employer contribution from 
the State of 20 per cent of gross income, minus employee contributions.6 
 
RESULTS 
Scale of pension tax relief 
We begin by examining the aggregate extent of tax relief as estimated by 
SWITCH. In order to do so, we adopt the same framework as in Revenue 
estimates of the cost of pension tax reliefs i.e. the scale of tax relief is measured 
by the increase in revenue attained by moving from an EET system to a TET 
system. This analysis is a purely technical construct: it does not imply that a TET 
system is an appropriate one. It gives some information, but not a complete 
picture, of the changes involved in moving to a TEE (prepaid expenditure tax) or a 
TTE (comprehensive income tax) system.7 More specific potential reforms, which 
have been considered in the Green Paper on pensions (DSP, 2007) are examined 
in the next section.  
 
 
                                                 
 
5  The introduction of the Single Public Service Pension Scheme for new entrants to the public sector from 2013 will 
affect the implicit contribution rate of the State for those subject to it. While this could be addressed in further work, 
the main impacts are well captured in the current analysis attributing the 20 per cent contribution to all staff, 
because the numbers of new entrants since 2013 is small in data collected in 2013 and 2014. 
6  If we were to include PRD in the contribution of the public sector employee, the amount of the imputed government 
contribution would decrease mechanically as it is calculated as 20 per cent of gross employee income minus 
employee contributions. This alternative method would result in no overall change to the total cost of tax relief or to 
its distributional implications. 
7  As noted earlier, these characterisations of potential future systems are related to arguments concerning the extent 
of ‘deferred taxation’. 
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Table 1 shows the total cost of tax relief on private pension contributions i.e. the 
additional cost of an EET system compared to a TET system. We focus on 
simulations for 2017 but also report simulations from 2013 which can be 
compared to the latest publicly available Revenue Commissioners’ data. In 2017, 
the cost of tax relief on pension contributions is estimated to be in the region of 
€2.2 billion. Of this figure, most of the cost relates to tax relief on employee 
contributions (€729 million) and government contributions (€778 million), but 
employer contributions also account for €541 million, and the cost of tax relief on 
pension contributions of the self-employed is estimated at around €185 million. 
 
TABLE 1 ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
  SWITCH 2013 SWITCH 2017 Revenue Commissioners 2013 
Employee Contributions 653 729 552 
Employer Contributions 486 541 497 
Personal Pensions 155 185 211 
Sub-total 1,295 1,455 1,260 
Government Contributions 764 778  
Overall Total 2,058 2,232  
 
Source:  SWITCH 2013 results based on 2013 policies used with 2013 SILC. SWITCH 2017 results based on 2017 policies used with pooled 
2013-2014 data. Revenue Commissioners figures taken from Revenue Commissioners on-line statistics 
(https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/tax-expenditures/costs-tax-expenditures.pdf). 
 
TABLE 2  ESTIMATES OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS BY SECTOR 
 SWITCH 2017 
Private sector (employee + employer) 935 
Public sector (employee + government) 1,112 
Personal pensions 185 
Total 2,232 
 
Source:  SWITCH 2017 results based on 2017 policies used with pooled 2013-2014 data. 
 
We can also look at the split of tax relief between the public and private sector. 
Table 2 shows that employee and employer tax relief in the private sector 
accounts for almost half of the total cost at €935 million. Tax relief on employee 
and government contributions in the public sector account for a further €1.1 
billion. 
 
From our simulations, we can also identify how gains from this tax relief are 
distributed. Figure 1 shows the pattern of gains and clearly indicates that higher 
earners benefit more from tax relief on pension contributions than lower earners. 
The top four deciles of the income distribution gain between 3-4.5 per cent of 
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disposable income due to tax relief on pension contributions. Gains are more 
modest around the middle of the income distribution (1-2 per cent) and there is 
virtually no impact for the bottom three deciles. This pattern of gains is similar to 
that reported by Collins and Hughes (2017) for employer and employee pension 
contributions. 
 
FIGURE 1  THE DIFFERENCE IN HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME BY DECILE DUE TO TAX 
RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
  
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations using SWITCH 2017 policies linked to pooled 2013-2014 SILC data. 
 
Lastly, Table 3 looks at the pattern of gains by family type. Overall, tax relief on 
pension contributions leads to an average gain of around 2.6 per cent of 
household disposable income. However, this gain is not uniform across 
household types. Dual earner couples (with and without children) gain the most 
(around 4 per cent of disposable income) followed closely by employed lone 
parents (4 per cent); single earner couples with children (2.5 per cent) and 
without children (2.9 per cent); and single employed individuals without children 
(2.8 per cent). Altogether, around 65 per cent of all households would lose in 
excess of 2.5 per cent of their disposable income on average if tax relief on 
pension contributions was abolished.  
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TABLE 3  THE DIFFERENCE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE IN THE ABSENCE OF 
TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Baseline 
Proportion of the 
population 
Dual Earner Couple with Children 4.3 9.1 
Dual Earner Couple without Children 4.1 5.0 
Employed Lone Parent 4.0 5.1 
Single Earner Couple without Children 2.9 5.6 
Single Employed without Children 2.8 32.5 
Dual Earner Couple with Relative Assisting 2.7 0.3 
Single Earner Couple with Children 2.5 8.3 
Retired Couple 0.4 8.5 
Single Retired Tax Unit 0.0 10.1 
All Other Tax Units 0.0 9.6 
Non-Earning Lone Parent 0.0 1.7 
Non-Earning Couple (>= 1 UE) with Kids 0.0 0.5 
Non-Earning Couple (>= 1 UE) no Kids 0.0 0.3 
Single Unemployed without Children -0.1 3.3 
All 2.6 100.0 
 
Source:  Baseline figures represent the 2017 situation compared to a situation with no tax relief on pension contributions. 
 
Reform 
We consider three potential reforms to the policy of tax relief on pension 
contributions. In System A, the cap on tax relief for pension contributions is 
halved from €115,000 to €57,500. In System B, tax relief is granted at the 
standard rate only, i.e. 20 per cent rather than the marginal tax rate of the 
individual. In System C, tax relief is granted at a hybrid standardised rate of 30 per 
cent. The cost of each of these systems is set out in Table 4. System A costs just 5 
per cent less than the baseline 2017 system. Systems B and C, which standardise 
the rate of relief at 20 per cent and 30 per cent respectively, result in higher 
savings. These amount to 46 per cent of the total cost of tax relief for System B 
and 19 per cent for System C.  
 
TABLE 4  ESTIMATES OF THE CHANGE IN THE COST OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
System 
A 
System 
B 
System 
C 
Change in tax relief on pension contributions (€ million) -114 -1,022 -420 
 -5% -46% -19% 
 
Source:  All costs are calculated relative to a system with no tax relief on pension contributions. System A halves the cap on tax relief 
from €115,000 to €57,500. System B and System C introduce standardisation of tax relief on pension contributions at 20 per 
cent and 30 per cent respectively. 
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FIGURE 2  THE DIFFERENCE IN HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME BY DECILE DUE TO 
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
  
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations using SWITCH 2017 policies linked to pooled 2013-2014 SILC data 
-2.50
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 d
is
po
sa
bl
e 
in
co
m
e 
Disposable income decile 
System A - cap on tax relief halved 
-2.50
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 d
is
po
sa
bl
e 
in
co
m
e 
Disposable income decile 
System B - tax relief standardised at 20%  
-2.50
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 d
is
po
sa
bl
e 
in
co
m
e 
Disposable income decile 
System C - tax relief standardised at 30% 
 
12 
 
Figure 2 shows how disposable income by decile changes under the three 
alternative systems of tax relief on pension contributions. In System A, which 
decreases the cap on tax relief, there is little change to the distribution of tax 
relief on pension contributions. There are small losses for the top three deciles of 
disposable income but little change elsewhere in the income distribution. In 
System B, which standardises tax relief at 20 per cent, gains from tax relief on 
pension contributions are lower at all deciles (except Decile 1) but there is 
convergence in gains across the income distribution as richer households lose 
more than poorer households. The same logic applies to System C, which 
standardises tax relief at 30 per cent. In System C, households in the upper half of 
the income distribution lose compared to the baseline scenario but losses are not 
as large as with standardisation at 20 per cent (System B) because the rate at 
which the tax relief rate is standardised is higher. By standardising tax relief at 30 
per cent (System C), the gains of the top four deciles of the income distribution 
fall while the gains to the lower half of the income distribution are largely 
unchanged. 
 
Table 5 shows how the gains from tax relief on pension contributions by family 
type change in the three reform scenarios. Changes in these gains are modest in 
System A with most household types losing between 1 per cent and 7 per cent of 
disposable income compared to the baseline. System B and System C result in 
larger losses in comparison to the baseline. In System B, the households who 
benefit from tax relief on pension contributions lose just under half of this benefit 
compared to the baseline. In System C, most households who benefit from tax 
relief lose between 15-20 per cent of the benefit. There are no household types 
which stand out as losing relatively more or less than others in these reform 
systems.  
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TABLE 5  THE CHANGE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE RESULTING FROM 
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
System A 
% 
System B 
% 
System C 
% 
Proportion 
of the 
population 
Dual Earner Couple with Children -5 -47 -20 9.1 
Dual Earner Couple without Children -7 -47 -20 5.0 
Employed Lone Parent -4 -45 -17 5.1 
Single Earner Couple without Children -5 -42 -14 5.6 
Single Employed without Children -4 -47 -21 32.5 
Dual Earner Couple with Relative Assisting -2 -43 -16 0.3 
Single Earner Couple with Children -7 -43 -15 8.3 
Retired Couple -1 -40 -11 8.5 
Single Retired Tax Unit 0 -27 9 10.1 
All Other Tax Units 0 0 50 9.6 
Non-Earning Lone Parent 0 0 0 1.7 
Non-Earning Couple (>= 1 UE) with Kids 0 0 0 0.5 
Non-Earning Couple (>= 1 UE) no Kids 0 0 0 0.3 
Single Unemployed without Children 0 -100 -100 3.3 
All -5 -46 -19 100.0 
 
Source:  All figures show differences in disposable income compared to the 2017 system of tax relief on pension contributions. 
 
Behavioural effects 
So far, our analysis has refrained from discussing behavioural changes to any 
reform of the tax treatment of pensions. However, individuals may well react to a 
reform by increasing or decreasing the level of their contribution, thus changing 
the overall cost or saving from the reform. The literature indicates that these 
effects are likely to be small. Policy reforms which require individuals to actively 
change their contributions in order to benefit are likely to have a low response 
rate and, of those who respond, these are more likely to shift money destined for 
pension contributions to another savings account (which may also be used as a 
form of retirement income) rather than stop saving for retirement altogether 
(Attanasio et al., 2004; Chetty et al., 2014). As such, tax incentives for pension 
contributions face a substantial ‘deadweight’ problem, of subsidising savings that 
would have taken place anyway. This is particularly true for higher earners. As the 
reforms discussed in this report mainly affect the amount of tax deductible by 
higher earners, we might expect small behavioural responses from this group, 
who can be expected to decrease their pension contributions in response to the 
reform (thus increasing the total State savings from the reform). However, this 
decrease in pension contributions is likely to be at least partly offset by an 
increase in other types of saving. 
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CONCLUSION 
This report has re-examined the cost of tax relief on pension contributions 
compared to a benchmark scenario in which pension contributions are taxed 
both on the way in and on the way out of pension funds, as is done in Revenue 
costings. This analysis shows that the SWITCH model, using pooled data from the 
CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions for 2013 and 2014, broadly 
replicates the scale of pension tax relief identified by Revenue – around €1.3 
billion annually – and confirms that most of the gains from tax relief on 
contributions are concentrated in the upper half of the income distribution. Dual 
earner couples gain the most, followed by employed lone parents, single earner 
couples and single employed individuals without children. 
 
Taking into account the government’s financial support of public sector pensions 
– which constitutes a ‘benefit-in-kind’ to public sector employees - increases the 
estimated cost of tax relief on pension contributions by almost €0.8 billion 
annually. The cost of tax relief on public sector pensions, given the addition of 
these implicit employer contributions by the government, accounts for more than 
half of the total cost of tax relief on pension contributions.  
 
Given the wide variation across countries in the tax treatment of pensions (see, 
for example, Whitehouse, 1999), there is no single tax treatment which can be 
identified as commanding universal acceptance as a standard. Our analysis 
focuses on the first-round implications (before any responses in savings or labour 
supply behaviour) to some widely discussed potential changes in the tax 
treatment of pensions (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2007).  
 
Using SWITCH, we simulate a number of reforms to the current tax treatment of 
pensions including a halving of the cap on tax relief and a switch to a 
standardised rate of relief of 20 per cent or 30 per cent. These scenarios result in 
savings of between 5 and 46 per cent of the total cost of tax relief on pension 
contributions before behavioural responses. In all scenarios, richer households 
lose the most from any reform but losses are minimal in the case of altering the 
cap on tax relief. In the case of standardisation of tax relief, richer households 
lose much more than poorer ones leading to a convergence in the distribution of 
gains from tax relief.  
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